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  This paper aims at evaluating the effect of the amount of older workers exits (aged 50 
or more) on the entries of youngsters at a local labour market level, during years 1985 - 2002. 
If we can observe some effect of the exits on the entries, it will shed light on the substitution 
between older workers and youngsters. Moreover, since in our model the causal agent cannot 
be specified a – priori, we don’t know what causes what. Hence, we are actually looking for a 
correlation  between  these  two  quantities.  Systematic  differences  in  background 
characteristics, between local markets with different levels of the older workers exits, can bias 
the  effect  estimation  on  the  entries  of  youngsters.  In  order  to  adjust  for  this,  we  apply 
propensity score methods as extended and generalized in a setting with a continuous treatment 
by Hirano and Imbens (2004).  Our results show a positive and significant correlation between 
exits of older workers and entries of youngsters. 
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1   Introduction 
  Over the last three decades, the most of European countries experienced an ageing of 
their population along with a fall in employment rate among older workers. In the face of 
declining ratios of economically active to retired households, some countries increased their 
legal  retirement  age  to  balance  the  budget  of  their  pay-as-you-go  retirement  schemes. 
However, the efficiency of such a policy option depends strongly on the impact of an increase 
in retirement age on job creation and employment among the younger cohorts of workers. 
 At first sight, we can think that an increase in legal retirement age, encouraging firms 
to maintain their aging workforce, could slowdown the dynamics of new hirings, if firms were 
expected to squeeze out their older workers  and to replace them by new  young workers. 
However, this simplistic idea has been severely criticized by  recent papers. Cadiou et al. 
(2002) highlight the fact that the low probability to find a job for youngsters stems from their 
lack of experience. Consequently, they can not fill a job requiring more tenure in the firm. In 
this setting, youngsters and senior workers are not perfectly substitutable.  
Even though the two sorts of jobs for the  younger and the older generation differ 
greatly in the set of skill and experience requirements, a decrease in exits of older workers 
may have a negative impact on the hiring level of youngsters, through a vacancy-chain effect 
(Contini and Revelli, 1997). The idea is the following: if we consider within a local labour 
market
1,  that  the  exit  of  an  older  worker  implies  a  vacancy
2,  there  is  a  non-negative 
probability that it will be filled by an employed job seeker (attracted by better opportunities or 
higher wage) belonging to the same age group or to the previous age group. Therefore, it 
implies a new vacancy that can be filled by another younger employed job seeker, involving 
job-to-job flows that may result in hiring a young worker from out of the internal labour 
market.  
 
Although substitutability between older workers and youngsters in the labour market 
appears to be a key point to better grasp the effect of an increase in retirement age, few papers 
address this issue empirically.  In  a macroeconomic perspective, using  French data,  Bozio 
(2006) investigates the effect of a variation in exits of older workers on hirings of youngsters, 
using financial incentives of the retirement decision as instrumental variables. He finds that 
over time an increase in exits of older workers is not correlated with the youth unemployment 
rate.  
In a microeconomic perspective, Portugal et al. (2007) investigate the effect of the 
increase in legal retirement age for women on worker flows of different age groups, using 
detailed matched employer-employee Portuguese data. Their empirical methodology lies on a 
quasi-experiment given the fact that only women are affected by the retirement reform. Using 
a  difference-in-difference  matching  method,  they  show  that  treated  firms  hire  one  to  two 
fewer workers  for  each senior retained  after the increase in legal  retirement age and this 
decrease in job creation is particularly strong for younger workers.  
 
In this paper we investigate the  correlation between the exits of older workers on 
hirings  of  youngsters,  in  the  light  of  the  vacancy-chain  theory,  using  Italian  matched 
employer-employee  data.  Consequently,  we  do  not  consider  firms  but  rather  local  labour 
markets,  to  account  for  job-to-job  flows.  Using  propensity  score  matching  methods 
                                                 
1 Here we refer to as “local labour market” a set of firms of a given sector and in a given geographical area, and 
whose jobs have the same skill level (white collar or blue collar workers) 
2 It is the case if there is no employment contraction   3 
generalized in a setting with a continuous treatment (Hirano and Imbens, 2004), we find a 
strong positive correlation between net exits of older workers and net entries of youngsters.  
This article is organized in the following way: in section 2 we explain our empirical 
methodology, in section 3, we describe the type of data used and finally, in section 4 and 5 we 
report the results and conclusions. 
 
2  Causal agent and methodology 
Actually, in our model, the causal agent cannot be specified a – priori, that is: 
- we can observe old exits followed by young entries 
- (but also) we can first have young entries that cause old exits.  
We can say, we don’t know what causes what.  
In fact, since we want to investigate the substitution between young and old workers, in terms 
of entries of the former and exits of the latter, we can have different causal processes. For 
example, we can observe: 
- entries of youngsters - because they are more convenient in terms of salary -  that 
imply exits for elders 
- exits of elders, that imply vacancies available for young workers  
In both situations, young and old workers need to be perfect substitutes. As a consequence, 
we  are  looking  for  a  correlation  between  these  two  quantities  and  it  is  arbitrary  the 
identification of the outcome Y as well as of the treatment variable (that is, entries or exits can 
respectively be the treatment and the outcome or the inverse). 
Moreover, if they are substitutes, we don’t know a-priori the temporal sequence of the 
events. So, in the same year, we can observe: 
- entries of young and, only later, exits of old  
(because firms need to train the new entry, before the exit of the old workers) 
- contemporary entries of  young and exits of older people… 
In other words, our null hypothesis is no-correlation between young and old workers 
within synthetic firms, that we can instead find at  a labour market level, because of,  for 
example,  the entry of new enterprises who can hire new young workers. 
 
Anyway, we decided to set the variation in exits of older workers, between year t and the 
year (t+1), as the treatment variable, evaluating the effect of the net exits on the net entries of 
youngsters, during years 1987 - 2002. In particular, we consider waves of three years, starting 
from 1989 until 2002. Using the potential outcome approach to causal inference (Rubin, 1974, 
1978), we estimate a continuous dose-response function that relates each value of the dose, 
i.e.,  net  elders’  exits,  to  the  net  youngsters’  entries,  at  a  labour  market  level.  Formally, 
consider a set of N local labour markets, and denote each of them by subscript i: i Î {1, ..., 
N}. For each local markets i, we observe a vector of pre-treatment variables, Xi, the net older 
workers’ exits, Ti, and the value of the outcome variable associated with this ‘treatment level’, 
Yi = Yi(Ti), with Yi represented by the net younger workers’ entries. As in the binary treatment 
context, propensity scores methods in a setting with continuous treatments rely heavily on the 
key  assumption that adjusting for pre-treatment differences solve the problem of drawing 
causal inference. Formally, we make the weak unconfoundedness assumption, introduced by 
Hirano  and  Imbens  (2004),  which  requires  that  the  treatment  assignment  mechanism  is 
conditional independent of each potential outcome given the pre-treatment variables:  
 
Yi(t) ^ Ti|Xi for all tÎT 
   4 
assuming that {Yi(t)}tÎT , Ti, and Xi, i = 1, ..., N are defined on a common probability space, 
that Ti is continuously distributed with respect to Lebesgue measure on T, and that Yi = Yi(Ti) 
is a well defined random variable. Given unconfoundedness, we can apply matching methods 
based on the Generalized Propensity Score (GPS) with continuous treatments introduced by 
Imbens  and  Hirano  (2004).  The  GPS  is  defined  as  the  conditional  density  of  the  actual 
treatment given the observed covariates. Formally, let r(t, x) = fT|X(t|x) be the conditional 
density of the treatment given the covariates. Then, the GPS is Ri = r(Ti,Xi). The GPS is a 
balancing score, that is, within strata with the same value of r(t, x), the probability that T = t 
does  not  depend  on  the  value  of  X.  In  combination  with  the  weak  unconfoundedness 
assumption, this balancing property implies that for every tÎT 
 
fT(t|r(t, Xi), Yi(t)) = fT(t|r(t, Xi)). 
 
As a result, the GPS can be used to eliminate any biases associated with differences in 
the covariates. Formally, if the assignment to the treatment is weakly unconfounded, given 
pre-treatment variables Xi, then  
 
m(t, r) = E[Yi(t)|r(t,Xi) = r] = E [Yi |Ti = t, Ri = r]   and    (t) = E [m(t, r(t,Xi))]. 
 
The  GPS  methods  are  implemented  in  our  application  using  the  gpscore,  dose-
response  STATA  package  (Bia  &  Mattei,  2008).  A  key  assumption  in  the  STATA 
implemented  version  of  the  GPS  methods  is  the  normality  of  the  treatment  variable 
conditional on the pre-treatment covariates. In our application we assume that the Box – Cox 
transformation of the treatment (amount of elders’ exit) has a Normal distribution, given the 





























Then, we assume that   BoxCox(Ti) | X i ~N(b0 + b1 X i , б
2 )
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3  Data 
 
  In our elaboration we use the Worker Histories Italian Panel (WHIP), a database of 
individual work histories, based on Inps administrative data. The reference population is made 
up by all the people – Italian and foreign – who have worked in Italy even only for only a part 
of  their  working  career.    The  WHIP  section  concerning  employee  contracts  is  a  Linked 
Employer Employee Database: in addition to the data about the contract, thanks to a linkage 
with the Inps Firm Observatory, data concerning the firm in which the worker is employed is 
also available.  
Nevertheless,  the  available  firm  sample  is  worker-based.  As  a  consequence  the 
archives supplied by Inps concern neither the firms population nor a random sample. Since we 
are interested in the correlation between entries of young workers and exits of old workers, to 
avoid  the  problem  of  a  non  representative  sample  of  enterprises,  we  decided  to  adopt  a 
synthetic firms approach, pooling together firms observed in a certain province and sector. So, 
the statistic unit is now the combination between these two variables, inducing to investigate 
                                                 
3 The parameter l, which the Box – Cox transformation depends on, is estimated from the data.   5 
the eventual substitution between old and young workers, we can say, at a local labour market 
level.  
We can have a discussion about this approach. Indeed, it may lead us to misestimate 
the worker flows in our economy, with respect to a firm-level analysis. To test the accuracy of 
this method, Contini et al. (2008) investigated wage mobility and dynamics in Veneto region, 
comparing the results obtained by using synthetic firms approach with those resulting from a 
firm-level  analysis.  They  found  similar  result,  even  though  the  first  approach  tend  to 
overestimate  the  within  firm  mobility  and  to  underestimate  the  between  firms  mobility. 
However, they show that this problem decreases if we decrease the size of the cell. So there is 
a  trade-off  in  the  choice  of  the  disaggregating  level,  between  having  the  finest  grid,  and 
having a sufficient number of observations in each cell.  
Furthermore, studying the worker mobility within a local labour market allows us to 
account for the job to job flows. In Italy, during the period of interest, these type of flows 
represent the major part of the observed flows as shown by Leombruni and Quaranta (2005). 
They show that these flows are observed almost only within an activity sector, in other words, 
the inter-sectorial mobility is very weak. Furthermore, investigating the geographical worker 
mobility,  they  observe  that  it  represents  a  small  part  of  the  worker  flows,  so  inter-area 
mobility is also very weak. Therefore when defining a local labour market, we can control for 
all the worker flows, induced by the variation in separation rate of older workers, through the 
phenomena of vacancy-chain. Hence, we organized the data by province and sector, getting 
about 800 cells
4 by wave. 
 
To satisfy the unconfoundedness assumption we consider pre-treatment variables likely to 
have an impact on elders’ exits and youngsters’ entries. First we consider the gender structure 
of the local labour market, namely the share of women observed for each statistic unit. We 
also control for the age structure of each labour market, considering the share of workers aged 
less than 30 and the share of workers aged 50 or more.  
Regarding the youngsters, to isolate the effect of the introduction of the CFL contracts on 
the young workers’ entries, we control for the share of young employed with this type of 
contract for each statistic unit. We also introduce as pre-treatment variable the ratio between 
the  wages  of  young  and  older  workers.  Indeed,  this  gap  may  have  some  impact  on  the 
substitutability between these two cohorts of workers. Furthermore, this substitutability may 
also be affected by the average skill level within each local labour market. Hence we control 
for the share of blue collar employees for each statistic unit.  
Drawing on previous studies of Contini et al. (2002) it appears that the age and the size of 
firms have a strong impact on worker mobility. Consequently, we consider as pre-treatment 
variable the share of young enterprises (less than 8 years) and the share of small firms (less 
than 9 workers). To control for the differences in economic situation between local labour 
markets,  we  consider  as  pre-treatment  variables  the  unemployment  rate  within  each  cell. 
Finally, to control for a simple size effect, we introduce the variable entitled “occupational 
level”  namely  the  number  of  employees  by  province  and  sector.  All  these  pre-treatment 
variables are considered at time (t - 1) and (t - 2).  
 
As already underlined, we want to estimate the effect of the old exits on the young entries, 
in a dynamic setting, within waves of three years. So, for example, starting from 1989, we set 
the “treatment period” in that year, considering as pre-treatment variables the values of all 
covariates in 1988 and 1987. Then, we step one year forward, getting a new wave, where now 
the treatment period is 1990 and the all pre-treatment variables are set in the two previous 
                                                 
4 That is, 800 different combinations  of province and sector.   6 
years  (1989,  1988).  We  make  this  until  2002,  getting  a  total  of  14  waves  to  investigate. 
Moreover, we also introduced job creation (named jc-t2) and job destruction (named jd-t2) as 
control variable at time t. We made this choice because we can reasonably suppose a strong 
correlation between the amount of the old workers exits and the youngsters’ entries with these 
two quantities, just in the same period. In fact, it is plausible to think that a higher level of 
job-creation, just after, induce higher probabilities of being hired as well as a lower level of 
job destruction. 
4  Results 
To be effective, matching should balance characteristics across the treatment groups, 
The extent to which this has been achieved can be explored by comparing balance in the pre-
treatment  covariates  before  and  after  adjusting  for  the  estimated  GPS.  For  each  of  the 
covariates, we investigate the balance by testing whether the mean in each treatment interval 
is different from the mean in the other ones. Table 1, in Appendix, provides the unadjusted 
and GPS – adjusted mean differences and the Bayes - Factor Test statistics
5 for equality of 
means, considering three intervals of elders’ exit: [0.4, 1.3), [1.3, 2.6) and [2.6, 13). Adjusting 
for the GPS seems to improve the balance, above all when the unadjusted differences are 
high. As an example, consider the variables entry and occupational level, at time t0 (but also at 
time t1).The mean difference between treatment group, number of elders’exits , [0.4, 1.3) and 
the other ones is 5.2 (SE = 1.044) for the former and 120.2 (SE = 15.8) for the latter. After 
adjusting for the GPS these differences dropped  to 3.5 (SE =1.2),  and 76.5 (SE= 17.7), 
respectively.  
In order to estimate
6 the effect of exits on entries (we could also say: find correlation 
between  exits  and  entries),  we  first  need  to  compute  the  conditional  expectation  of  the 
outcome, E[Y | T = t, R = r], that is equal to:   
E[Y | T = t, R = r]=E[Y(t) | r(t,X) = r]= β (t, r) 
and estimated as a function of a specific level of treatment and of a specific value of GPS R = 
r . Hence, average the conditional expectation over the marginal distribution r(t,X): 
 (t) = E[E[Y(t) | r(t,X) ]] 
to estimate the causal effect as a comparison of  (t) for different values of t. First of all, we 
estimate the GPS, verifying the most suitable specification of the conditional distribution of 
the treatment given covariates and investigating if the GPS satisfies the balancing property, 
wave by wave.  
In our application we specify a linear approximation in the model, in order to estimate 
the level of young entries given T = t and the pscore: 
 
E[y, r] = b0 + b1t + b2pscore + b3 t*pscore 
 
So, we estimate the outcome, young entries, as a mean weighted by each different pscore, 
predicted in correspondence of all specific level of exits we are interested in.  
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5 Bayes factors are interpreted following Jeffrey (1969). Let B01 denote the Bayes Factor for nested models M0 Ì 
M1, then B01 > 1: evidence supports M0; 1 > B01 > 10
-0.5: very slight against M0; 10
-0.5 > B01 > 10
-1: moderate 
against M0; 10
-1 > B01 > 10
-2:strong to very strong against M0; 10
-2 > B01:decisive against M0; 
6 All the estimates are derived introducing the cluster option in the dose-response command (that is: controlling 
for province and sector)   7 
Here we reported 3 graphs. In the first one we consider the confidence interval for difference 
between the outcome in t = 1and the outcome corresponding to an increase of the treatment 
equals to 1: 
u(t +  t) −  (t), with  t = 1 
 
that we can interpret as a causal effect.  Hence, the results, reported in Graph 1, show what 
would be the variation of young workers’ entries, if the elders’ exits increased from 1 to 2, 
over time. In this case, we have that one more elder’s exit corresponds to more than one (+ 
1,5) young workers’ entry in 1989. We find a recession during 1990 and 1993, with (about) a 
null variation in youngsters’ entries in correspondence of 1 more elder’s exit, while, between 
1995 and 2000, this difference hovers about 1 more young worker’s entry. In 2002 the effect 
of one more old worker’s exit is the highest one and equals to (about) 2 more young workers.  
Moreover, the estimates (in terms of difference) we got result to be very significant over 
the  time  (except  for  the  years  1991,  1993).  In  Graph  2,  we  reported  the  dose-response 
function and the treatment effect function in correspondence of different values of elders’ 
exits, during 1996. We can note how 1 more exit always corresponds to one more entry of 
young workers (for all the treatment values). Moreover, we got very significant estimates in 
terms of variation of youngsters’ entries for all the elders’ exits considered. In Graph 3 we 
reported the dose-response function and the treatment effect function in correspondence of 
different  values  of  elders’  exits,  during  1997.  We  can  note  how  1  more  exit  in  t=1, 
corresponds to one more entry of young workers, while we would find 1,5 more youngster 
entry if we had 1 more exit in correspondence of t=2. Concerning the other variations in terms 
of  youngsters’  entries,  this  difference  tends  to  decrease.  Moreover,  the  treatment  effect 
estimates got in correspondence of  1, 2, …4 elders’ exits result to be very significant. 
5  Conclusions 
 
In this article we try to evaluate the effect of the amount of older workers net exits 
(aged 50 or more) on the net entry of youngsters at a local labour market level, during years 
1985 - 2002. 
In order to avoid the problem of a non representative sample of enterprises and to account for 
job-to-job  flows,  we  decide  to  adopt  a  synthetic  firms  approach,  pooling  together  firms 
observed in a certain province and sector, using the work histories Italian panel (WHIP) of 
administrative source. We estimate the dose – response functions and the effect of the amount 
of elders’ exits on youngsters’ entries, applying propensity score methods, as extended and 
generalized  in  a  setting  with  a  continuous  treatment  by  Hirano  and  Imbens  (2004).    Our 
results show a positive and significant correlation (except for the years 1991, 1993) between 
net exits of older workers and net entry of youngsters. In particular, we find that the variation 
of youngsters, given an increase of the elders’ exits from 1 to 2, is on average equal to more 
than one young workers’ entry, with the highest value equals to (about) 2 in 2002.  
  There are two main directions for future research. The first is to extend this study 
identifying  the  outcome  Y  with  the  elders’  exits  and  choosing  as  treatment  variable  the 
youngsters’ entries, since, as already underlined, we are looking for a correlation between 
these two quantities and it is arbitrary the identification of the outcome as well as of the 
treatment variable. Secondly, it could be of considerable interest to investigate the substitution 
between blue collars and white collars, for example, in terms of entries of the former and exits 
of the latter, highlighting, in this way, an eventual correlation between these two variables, 
conditional to the workers’ status. Finally, we could also analyze the robustness of our results 
with  respect  to  the  underlying  identifying  assumptions,  through  appropriate  sensitivity 
analyses.   8 
APPENDIX 
Table 1 Synthetic firms: balance given the generalized propensity score (year 1989) 
 Mean Difference (MD) (Standard error, SE, in parenthesis) and Bayes Factor statistics for equality of means 
Treatment interval  [0.4; 1,3)  [1,3; 2.61)  [2,61; 13) 
   Unadjasted  GPS -Adjusted  Unadjasted  GPS -Adjusted  Unadjasted  GPS -Adjusted 
Variables  MD   BF  MD  BF  MD  BF  MD  BF  MD  BF  MD  BF 
   (SE)        (SE)     (SE)     (SE)     (SE)    
share foreigners t1  .0005  13.77  .007  1.5919  -.003  9.03  -.004  3.78  .002  10.45  .002  7.22 
  (.003)   .  (.004)    (.003)    (.004)    (.003)    .004   
share youngsters t1  .0432  .537  .026  3.124  -.001  12.89  .006  6.86  -.047  .39  -.025  3.77 
  (.0169)    (.018)    (.018)    (.019)    (.018)    (.020)   
share elders t1  .004  12.57  -.005  6.8216  -.010  5.97  -.012  2.23  .010  9.91  .010  4.22 
  .(007)    (.008)    (.008)    (.008)    (.008)    (.009)   
share young firms t1  .038  1.51  -.002  8.4144  .011  10.73  .030  2.27  -.054  .218  -.046  .897 
  (.018)    (.019)    (.019)    (.020)    (.019)    (.021)   
share female t1  .058  .196  .051  .66364  -.016  9.51  -.011  6.45  -.049  .861  -.012  7.31 
  (.019)    (.022)    (.021)    (.023)    (.021)    (.025)   
share blue collar t1  -.020  12.36  -.025  4.9499  .038  3.44  .024  4.37  -.025  7.26  -.013  7.27 
  (.021)    (.024)    (.023)    (.024)    (.023)    (.027)   
share small firms t1  .058  1.04  .008  8.0992  .003  12.89  .037  3.08  -.070  .564  -.073  .553 
  (.025)    (.028)    (.027)    (.028)    (.027)    (.031)   
ratio youngsters training contracts t1  .017  9.57  .001  8.4507  .010  11.54  .006  6.98  -.029  4.92  -.023  5.33 
  (.019)    (.022)    (.021)    (.022)    (.020)    (.025)   
entry t0  5.27  6.0e-05  3.56  .11298  2.44  1.39  1.62  3.27  -8.39  4.0e-12  -4.44  .016 
  (1.044)    (1.204)    (1.15)    (1.28)    (1.06)    (1.24)   
occupational level t0  120.23  2.8e-11  76.58  .00115  41.99  .919  39.96  1.10  -178.01  5.8e-24  -75.32  .0003 
  (15.81)    (17.74)    (18.24)    (20.54)    (15.55)    (16.28)   
share foreigners t0  .0007  13.58  .006  1.9737  -.003  9.91  -.003  5.12  .001  11.66  .0006  8.15 
  (.003)    (.003)    (.003)    (.003)    (.003)    (.004)   
share youngsters t0  .051  .152  .023  3.7582  -.005  12.30  .006  6.90  -.053  .198  -.026  3.75 
  (.017)    (.018)    (.018)    (.019)    (.018)    (.021)   
share elders t0  .005  11.24  -.005  6.5897  -.008  7.34  -.007  5.13  .002  12.28  .004  7.22 
  (.007)    (.008)    (.008)    (.008)    (.008)    (.009)     9 
share young firms t0  .042  .921  -.002  8.4019  .004  12.64  .029  2.60  -.052  .341  -.044  1.18 
  (.018)    (.020    (.019)    (.020)    (.019)    (.022)   
share female t0  .058  .185  .052  .643  -.015  10.09  -.010  6.63  -.052  .679  -.011  7.37 
  (.019)    (.022)    (.021)    (.023)    (.021)    (.025)   
share blue collar t0  -.006  13.41  -.025  5.03  .036  3.76  .026  4.02  -.029  5.93  -.020  6.27 
  (.021)    (.024)    (.023)    (.024)    (.023)    (.027)   
share small firms t0  .061  .840  .006  8.22  -.003  12.84  .035  3.46  -.066  .704  -.069  .781 
  (.025)    (.028)    (.027)    (.028)    (.027)    (.031)   
ratio youngsters training contracts t0  -.012  10.23  -.003  8.31  .024  4.61  .015  5.21  -.010  11.05  -.016  6.004 
  (.015)    (.018)    (.016)    (.018)    (.016)    (.020)   
entry t1  5.69  3.7e-05  3.26  .316  3.04  .604  2.93  .75  -9.46  6.9e-14  -4.64  .0108 
  (1.10)    (1.26)    (1.22)    (1.37)    (1.11)    (1.25)   
occupational level t1  123.37  2.3e-11  78.78  .001  41.54  1.09  39.77  1.22  -181.14  1.2e-23  -77.92  .0002 
  (16.16)    (18.15)    (18.67)    (21.04)    (15.94)    (16.78)   
job creation t2  3.23  .025  2.61  .425  1.14  6.62  .900  5.27  -4.79  5.3e-05  -2.67  .463 
  (.904)    (1.06)    (.991)    (1.12)    (.949)    (1.11)   
Job destruction t2  1.03  .036  .366  4.77  .322  7.89  .260  5.66  -1.48  .0002  -.266  6.07 
  (.297)    (.344)    (.325)    (.366)    (.312)    (.343)   
unemployment rate t0  -.012  1.78  -.011  2.27  .002  11.73  .002  6.83  .011  2.93  .004  6.96 
  (.006)    (.007)    (.006)    (.007)    (.006)    (.007)   
unemployment rate t1  -.012  2.99  -.011  3.31  -.005  12.91  .0008  7.27  .014  2.06  .004  7.22 
  (.007)    (.008)    (.007)    (.008)    (.007)    (.009)   
ratio youngsters elders income t0  -.004  13.59  -.047  3.27  -.032  9.45  .022  6.03  .037  8.60  .012  7.86 
  (.039)    (.034)    (.042)    (.036)    (.041)    (.040)   
ratio youngsters elders income t1  .050  4.23  -.029  6.00  -.009  12.33  .026  5.69  -.047  5.11  -.050  3.98 
  (.032)    (.036)    (.035)    (.037)    (.034)    (.042)   
Minimum bayes factor =.00028006 < 0.01   10 
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